Accounting Information and the Outcome of Collective Bargaining: Some Exploratory
Evidence
Joel Amernic and Nissim Aranya
Accounting information has recently been shown to have strategic and tactical
roles in industrial relations (Ogden and Bougen, 1985; Amernic, 1985),
in addition to being a calculative device (Granof, 1973). This paper explores
the potential impact, in a not-for-profit (NFP) environment, that accounting
information may have on an important outcome of labor negotiations: bargaining
productivity. The NFP experimental setting chosen was a hypothetical community
service agency. Given the relatively unique industrial relations characteristics
of NFPs, the results suggest that disclosure of accounting information
may have a significant impact on bargaining productivity, depending in
part upon the nature of the particular bargaining relationship.
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